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More and more states are permitting same-sex unions to be cele-
brated, which will likely result in an increase in the number of individu-
als claiming that they are precluded by conscience from providing goods
or services to such families. While the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides great protection to religious belief, it pro-
vides much less protection to conscience-based conduct in violation of
nondiscrimination statutes, especially when such refusals of conscience
are in a commercial context.
This Article discusses a variety of cases that are often thought to
implicate matters of conscience-compelled speech, symbolic conduct,
conscientious objection-as well as several unemployment benefits and
right of association cases. While these cases might be interpreted in a
number of ways, they nonetheless seem to provide relatively little protec-
tion to conscience-based refusals to engage in allegedly symbolic activi-
ties that themselves might be interpreted in a number of ways.
After providing an analysis of existing constitutional protections,
the Article focuses on Elane Photography v. Willock, explaining how the
case should be decided in light of existing constitutional guarantees as
they have been explained by the Court. The Article concludes that were
the Court to ignore the current jurisprudence and find such conscience-
based actions protected under the Federal Constitution, the Court would
thereby create an exception that was difficult if not impossible to cabin,
which would lead to a variety of regrettable consequences.
t Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More and more states are affording recognition to same-sex rela-
tionships either by amending their marriage statutes or by creating a sep-
arate civil union or domestic partnership status. These developments
have not been greeted with universal acclaim. Indeed, some claim that
the promotion of same-sex marriage contravenes their religious princi-
ples and that they should not be forced to violate their consciences by
providing services to same-sex couples and their families. As more states
accord rights to sexual minorities, an increasing number of individuals
will likely claim that the First Amendment immunizes their conscience-
based refusals to provide goods or services to such allegedly objectiona-
ble families.
Last term, the United States Supreme Court heard two cases with
implications for same-sex couples and their families: United States v.
Windsor1 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.2 The former resulted in Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) being struck down,3 whereas
the denial of standing in the latter4 resulted in California again permitting
same-sex marriages to be celebrated.5 Because more and more states
I. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 ("The federal statute is invalid ....
4. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 ("We have never before upheld the standing of a private
party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We
decline to do so for the first time here.").
5. Eric Woomer, Same-Sex Couples Marry in County, DESERT SUN, July 2, 2013, at A3
("Same-sex marriages are underway in California .... ").
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(including California) now permit same-sex marriages to be celebrated,
the number of individuals who may seek a conscience-based exemption
for their refusals to provide services to same-sex couples and their chil-
dren will likely also increase. Ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court will have to clarify the conditions under which individuals are
entitled to conscience-based exemptions from the application of neutral
laws.
Thus far, the Court has given contradictory signals about the protec-
tions afforded to conscience. While individuals cannot be forced to af-
firm principles that they do not believe, the protections for symbolic
conduct are less clear. In addition, the Court has repeatedly emphasized
that individuals engaging in commerce do not have the same constitu-
tionally protected associational freedoms as they would in a noncommer-
cial context. Finally, while the Court has sometimes implied that the
Constitution takes religious convictions seriously, the Court's decisions
do not suggest that such convictions will trump the application of non-
discrimination laws in the commercial context. In short, a significant
change in the current jurisprudence would be required for such con-
science-based-exemption claims to win the day.
This Article examines several First Amendment grounds upon
which an exemption to providing goods or services to same-sex couples
and their children might be founded, analyzes how the Court has applied
First Amendment jurisprudence when discrimination on the basis of ori-
entation was at issue, and then focuses on how a much discussed case-
Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock6-should be decided. This Article
concludes that the First Amendment neither does nor should immunize
individuals engaging in commerce from nondiscrimination laws, reli-
gious qualms about treating customers and clients equally notwithstand-
ing.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment limits the degree to which the state can re-
quire private individuals to speak or to remain silent7T-absent compel-
ling justification, the state cannot force individuals to affirm a principle
in which they do not believe.8 Further, the state cannot require organiza-
tions to extend membership to nondesired individuals if so doing would
6. 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), affd, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
7. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("There is
certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment
guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.").
8. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("if there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
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change the organization's message.9 In addition, the Court has recog-
nized that individuals place great importance on being able to act in ac-
cord with their religious convictions.10 In short, the First Amendment
offers significant protections against government interference with ex-
pression and association, and some protection for conscience.
A. Protections Against Compelled Speech
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'" the Court
addressed whether children in public schools could be forced to salute
the flag in contravention of their faith. 2 The Court rejected the proposi-
tion that the Constitution permits the state to force an individual "to utter
what is not in his mind."' 3 At least in part because the "sole conflict
[wa]s between authority [i.e., the state] and rights of the individual'
' 4
and because the "freedom asserted by these appellees d[id] not bring
them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual,"'' 5 the
Court overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis16 and struck down
the flag salute requirement.
1 7 In a stirring and frequently cited passage,'
8
the Court explained, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'
' 9
9. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("In this respect, freedom of
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. . . . [Tlhe Court has
recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of pre-
serving other individual liberties.").
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (hold-
ing that it was a violation of the free exercise of religion of the First Amendment to deny unem-
ployment compensation benefits to a claimant who left his job for religious reasons); Sherbert v.
Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that it is unconstitutional to apply eligibility provisions for
unemployment compensation such that a claimant who refused employment because it required her
to work on Saturdays in contravention of her religious beliefs would be denied benefits).
I1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
12. See id. at 629.
13. ld. at 634, 642.
14. Id. at 630.
15. Id.
16. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
17. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
18. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 642); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 616 (2005) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 55 (1985) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982)
(quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514 n.9 (1980) (quoting Bar-
nete, 319 U.S. at 642); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at
642); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42);
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.15 (1957) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
19. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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Yet it is not always clear when one's required action is equivalent to
a forced confession contravening one's beliefs,20 and the Court has of-
fered too little guidance about how to resolve difficult cases. Instead, the
Barnette Court simply stated that "the compulsory flag salute and pledge
requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.",21 Precisely be-
cause the flag salute in that context was a "form of utterance' 22 symbol-
izing one's "adherence to government as presently organized"23 and
one's "acceptance of the political ideas [the flag] bespeaks,"24 there was
no need to discuss what a more ambiguous physical action in a more
neutral context would mean.
25
In Wooley v. Maynard,26 the Court was afforded another opportuni-
ty to discuss the conditions under which behavior would constitute a
forced affirmation. At issue was a New Hampshire requirement that the
state motto, "Live Free or Die," not be obscured on passenger license
plates.27 George and Maxine Maynard were Jehovah's Witnesses who
believed the state motto was "repugnant to their moral, religious, and
political beliefs"' 28 and who began to cover up the motto.29 The Court
framed the legal question as "whether the State may constitutionally re-
quire an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public., 30 But charac-
terizing the legal question in this way almost guaranteed the result-it is
as if what was at issue was whether the state could force an individual to
post political signs such as "Vote for Jones" in her yard.3'
20. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But if it is a per-
missible inference that one who is standing is doing so simply out of respect for the prayers of others
that are in progress, then how can it possibly be said that a 'reasonable dissenter.., could believe
that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval'?" (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 593
(majority opinion))).
21. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
22. Id. at 632.
23. Id. at 633.
24. Id.
25. See Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the Establishment Clause,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2010) ("But for the presence of the flag, the forced salute
might be thought to have a much different meaning. For example, were that same movement part of
an exercise in a physical education class where no flag was nearby, the compelled movement would
not implicate the same constitutional concerns, because it would not carry the same symbolism.").
26. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
27. Id. at 706-07 ("The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hampshire may constitu-
tionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the motto 'Live Free or Die' on pas-
senger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.").
28. Id. at 707.
29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 713.
31. See Laura Jackson, Case Note, The Constitution-It's What'sfor Dinner, 2 WYO. L. REV.
617, 626 (2002) (explaining that Wooley "addressed the issue of whether the State could require a
person to display a political message on private property"); Katherine Earle Yanes, Note, Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.: Has the Supreme Court Lost Its Way?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1461,
1473 (1998) (same).
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The Wooley Court referred to Barnette, noting that "[c]ompelling
the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement
upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on
a license plate."32 However, the Court characterized "the difference [a]s
essentially one of degree,33 holding that the "First Amendment protects
the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majori-
ty and to refuse to foster.., an idea they find morally objectionable."
34
Such a holding was unsurprising, given that the Court was in effect char-
acterizing the New Hampshire law as a kind of commandeering of pri-
vate individuals by the state to disseminate an approved message. The
Court described the state measure as "forc[ing] an individual ... to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view
he finds unacceptable,"35 and held that the state was precluded by the
Constitution from using its citizens in this way.
36
The difficulty was not that the state's message was itself so objec-
tionable, since New Hampshire's attempt to foster a "proper appreciation
of history, state pride, and individualism"37 was likely welcomed by
many.38 Rather, "the State's interest [in] disseminat[ing] an ideolo-
gy ... cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message."39 While the First Amendment
does not impose limits on what the government may say,40 it does impose
limits on what the Government may force an individual to say.
4 1
Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Wooley on the ground that the
"State has not forced appellees to 'say' anything; and it has not forced
them to communicate ideas with nonverbal actions reasonably likened to
'speech,' such as wearing a lapel button promoting a political candidate
or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture.' '42 Rehnquist's dissent might be
interpreted to have been making either of two different points. The first
is that having the slogan "Live Free or Die" on a license plate should not
be construed as speech at all, perhaps because the letters would be too
32. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714-15.
33. Id. at 715.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id; Vikram David Amar, Reflections on the Doctrinal and Big-Picture Issues Raised by
the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), 6
FlU L. REV. 9, 22 (2010) ("[T]he First Amendment prohibits government from mandating that
individuals be vessels for government speech.").
37. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
38. Id. at 715 ("The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire's
motto is not the test.").
39. ld. at 717.
40. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("The Free Speech
Clause ... does not regulate government speech." (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544
U.s. 550, 553 (2005))).
41. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557 ("We have sustained First Amendment challenges to alleg-
edly compelled expression in ... true 'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged
personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government.").
42. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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small to be seen or because the writing would be viewed as decorative
rather than as conveying information.3 However, current experience
belies that such expressions are viewed as not conveying any message.
For example, several states permit individuals to choose the message that
is on their license plates.44 The difficult question for the courts has not
been whether the specialty license plates constitute speech but, instead,
whether the speech is government speech, private speech, or both.45
At issue in Wooley was not the speech that the Maynards had cho-
sen to place on their license plate but, instead, the speech that New
Hampshire required. A different interpretation of Justice Rehnquist's
point is that the speech would likely be attributed to the state rather than
to the Maynards and that they would not be inferred to be endorsing any-
thing. 46 Thus, someone seeing the Maynards' license plate would not
impute any beliefs about freedom or death to the Maynards themselves.
Suppose that the Court had accepted Justice Rehnquist's assessment
that no one would impute an endorsement of the state motto to the
Maynards. The New Hampshire requirement might nonetheless have
been found constitutionally offensive if the license plate was viewed as
private47 rather than governmental property48 for a reason having nothing
to do with expression-for example, that the state was effecting a tak-
ing.49 In that event, however, Wooley would not be viewed as a seminal
First Amendment case.
50
43. Cf Nancy Cook, Breaking Silence with Ourselves: Stepping out of Safe Boundaries, 29
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 757, 759 (1995) (discussing "using words. . . merely as decorative diversions").
44. See, e.g., ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Tennessee
statutory law authorizes the sale of premium-priced license plates bearing special logotypes to raise
revenue for specific 'departments, agencies, charities, programs[,] and other activities impacting
Tennessee."' (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(i) (2013))); see also Nelda H. Cambron-
McCabe, Commentary, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving Government
Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. (WEST) 753, 762 (2012) ("Today specialty license plates have
proliferated as states have opened up a market that generates revenue for the state, and oftentimes to
the groups sponsoring specialty plates.").
45. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) ("[T]he
speech that appears on the so-called 'special' or 'vanity' license plate could prove to be the quintes-
sential example of speech that is both private and governmental ...."); Joseph Blocher, Government
Property and Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1413, 1479-80 (2011) (arguing that
"the expression emanating from specialty license plates is both governmental and private").
46. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The issue, unconfronted by the
Court, is whether appellees, in displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of
which is known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be considered to be advocating
political or ideological views.").
47. The Court explained that "New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty."
Id. at 715. But the Court did not specify whether the license, rather than the license plate, was the
private property.
48. Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1680(2010)
("[L]icense plates are considered to be governmental, rather than private property.").
49. Cf Gregory C. Sisk, Returning to the Pruneyard: The Unconstitutionality of State-
Sanctioned Trespass in the Name of Speech, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 389, 413 (2009) ("[T]he
governmentally encouraged physical invasion by strangers onto private property for speech, distribu-
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Nonetheless, the Court's rationale in both Barnette and Wooley af-
fords robust protection against compelled speech;51 the state cannot force
individuals to affirm messages that they do not believe. A separate issue,
however, involves the degree to which the symbolic conduct of private
individuals is protected.
B. Protections for Symbolic Conduct
In United States v. O'Brien,52 the Court announced the test for de-
termining the conditions under which the state regulation of symbolic
conduct violates constitutional guarantees. At issue was the criminal
prosecution of an individual for intentionally burning a draft card in front
of a courthouse.53 This act was performed during a period of social unrest
due to opposition to the Vietnam War,54 and O'Brien claimed that Con-
gress was trying to limit speech by targeting the burning of draft cards.55
The Court held that O'Brien's action was not properly characterized as
speech, rejecting "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea.",
56
Even if burning the draft card was not speech per se, a separate
question was whether O'Brien's action was nonetheless entitled to some
First Amendment protection, and the Court was willing to assume that it
was.57 But that did not settle whether his action was immune from prose-
cution.58 The Court outlined the relevant test for the regulation of sym-
tion of flyers, or any other purpose that the owner does not authorize is a classic example of a per se
taking.").
50. See Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say 'Ideology': Physicians and
the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 167 (2009) (describing "Wooley v. Maynard [as
one of the Court's] ... seminal speech cases"). See generally Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of
Information Licensing, 36 Hous. L. REV. 61, 84 (1999) (discussing "the seminal case of Wooley v.
Maynard').
51. See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695,
712 (2011) (describing Wooley and Barnette as "landmark cases" establishing the right to refrain
from speaking); Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: The Threat of State Public Accommodations Laws to
the First Amendment Rights of Artistic Businesses, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2012) ("The
right not to speak is most famously set forth in two Supreme Court cases, West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard.").
52. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
53. Id. at 369 ("David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service
registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.").
54. Cf David Kairys, The Contradictory Messages of Rehnquist-Roberts Era Speech Law:
Liberty and Justice for Some, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 195, 209 (2013) ("[T]he actual government
purpose in O'Brien was to prohibit draft card destruction as an expression of opposition to the draft
and the [Vietnam] War .... ").
55. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("O'Brien nonetheless argues that the 1965 Amendment is
unconstitutional in its application to him, and is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the
purpose' of Congress was 'to suppress freedom of speech."').
56. Id.
57. Id. (proceeding "on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment").
58. Id. ("[l]t does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity.").
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bolic conduct, explaining that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."59 The Court
summed up the test in the following way:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
60
When using the "no greater than is essential" language, the O'Brien
Court was not implying that narrow tailoring was required. On the con-
trary, the kind of tailoring required in the symbolic conduct context is
less exacting than the kind of tailoring required in the regulation of pure
speech. 6' The Court employs intermediate scrutiny to evaluate state regu-
lation of symbolic speech62 and strict scrutiny with respect to the regula-
tion of pure expression.63
There are two distinct respects in which O'Brien may be important
to consider in the context of a refusal to provide services for conscience-
based reasons. First, the Court is suggesting that merely because an indi-
vidual believes that her conduct is expressive will not make it so for con-
stitutional purposes. Second, even if a regulation affects conduct that is
expressive, that regulation may be subject to intermediate rather than
strict scrutiny and thus may be upheld as long as it promotes important
state interests.
Two issues should be distinguished. One is whether a particular ac-
tion should be characterized as pure speech rather than symbolic con-
duct. A different issue is whether an action is religiously inspired, be-
cause then an analysis may be necessary to determine whether the ex-
pression at issue-whether or not pure speech-must be accorded special
protection because it was required by conscience.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 377.
61. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) ("[W]ith respect to
government regulation of expressive conduct, including conduct expressive of political views... we
have not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."' (quot-
ing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))).
62. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native
American Sacred Sites, 17 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 269, 293 (2012) ("[T]he intermediate scrutiny test
[is] used in O'Brien to determine the validity of government restrictions on symbolic speech.").
63. See Laura Markey, Article, Repairing the Rusty Needle: Recognizing First Amendment
Protection for Tattoos, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 310, 311 (2012) ("If the government attempts to
restrict pure speech based on the content of the speech, it must overcome a presumption of unconsti-
tutionality and the strictest standard ofjudicial review, strict scrutiny.").
2014]
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C. Protections for Conscience
The Court has addressed the protections that should be accorded to
conscience-based activity in a few different kinds of cases. Some spelled
out the conditions under which conscientious objector status in particular
would be accorded, while others helped delimit more generally the extent
to which conscience-based activities would be protected.
Consider the Court's discussion of conscientious objector status in
United States v. Seeger.64 At issue was the proper interpretation of a fed-
eral statute affording an exemption "from combatant training and service
in the armed forces of the United States [to] those persons who by reason
of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war in any form." 65 David Seeger "declared that he was con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his
'religious' belief,"66 although his "belief was not in relation to a Supreme
Being as commonly understood.,67 The Court interpreted congressional
intent to include someone whose "given belief that is sincere and mean-
ingful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion., 68 This interpretation was a matter of statutory construction,69 alt-
hough Justice Douglas suggested in his concurrence that a contrary inter-
pretation would have resulted in a violation of constitutional guaran-
tees.7 0 Seeger has been interpreted to stand for a robust protection of con-
science.7'
Welsh v. United States7 2 involved another conscientious exemption
claim, and that plurality opinion also affords robust protections to con-
science Elliott Welsh II "held deep conscientious scruples against taking
part in wars where people were killed,, 73 although Welsh was "explic-
it... in denying that his views were religious. '74 This case might also be
64. 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
65. Id. at 164-65. The relevant section was "6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Ser-
vice Act, 50 U.S.C.App. s 456(j) (1958 ed.)." See id. at 164.
66. Id. at 166.
67. Id. at 167.
68. Id at 166.
69. Id. at 165-66 ("We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme
Being' rather than the designation 'God,' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training
and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views.").
70. Id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71. See Michael Rhea, Comment, Denying and Defining Religion Under the First Amend-
ment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach, 72 LA. L. REV.
1095, 1112 (2012) (reading Seeger to stand for the proposition that "individual interests in freedom
of conscience and of religion are to be protected as sacred even in the face of important state poli-
cies").
72. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
73. Id. at 337.
74. Id. at 341.
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interpreted to be a testament to the required state accommodation of con-
science.75
There is reason to believe, however, that conscience is not afforded
such robust protection after all. For example, Gillette v. United States
76
involved whether an individual who had religious objections to a particu-
lar war was entitled to conscientious objector status on that account. Guy
Gillette "stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense
or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure,
but declared his opposition to American military operations in Vietnam,
which he characterized as 'unjust."' 77 Gillette argued that "Congress
interferes with free exercise of religion by failing to relieve objectors to a
particular war from military service, when the objection is religious or
conscientious in nature.,,78 The Court recognized that some religions
distinguish among just and unjust wars, only prohibiting participation in
the latter,79 and did not question Gillette's sincere conviction that this
war was unjust and hence that participation in it would contravene his
religious principles.80 Nonetheless, the Court held that "valid neutral
reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war,"81 and
affirmed the lower court holding that Gillette was not entitled to an ex-
emption.82
Some of the cases implicating conscience concern a refusal to per-
form a job or work at certain times for religious reasons. Sherbert v. Ver-
ner 83 involved an individual, Adell Sherbert, who could not work on Sat-
urday because of her religious beliefs.84 She was not only fired from her
job because of her refusal to work on that day85 but also could not secure
any other job for that same reason.86 Her application for unemployment
75. SeeRhea, supranote 71,at 1112.
76. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
77. Id. at 439.
78. Id. at 448-49.
79. Id. at 452 ("[S]ome religious faiths themselves distinguish between personal participation
in 'just' and in 'unjust' wars, commending the former and forbidding the latter, and therefore adher-
ents of some religious faiths-and individuals whose personal beliefs of a religious nature include
the distinction-cannot object to all wars consistently with what is regarded as the true imperative of
conscience.").
80. Id. at 449 (assuming that the "beliefs concerning war have roots that are 'religious' in
nature within the meaning of the Amendment").
81. Id. at 454.
82. Id. at 463 ("[1]n Gillette's case (No. 85) there was a basis in fact to support administrative
denial of exemption .... ").
83. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
84. Id. at 399 ("Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church[,] ... would not
work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.").
85. Id. ("Appellant... was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would
not work on Saturday .... ").
86. Id. ("[S]he was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious scruples
she would not take Saturday work ....").
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benefits was denied because her refusal to work on Saturdays was
viewed as a disqualifying condition.
The United States Supreme Court noted that Sherbert was being
forced "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand,88 and held
that "South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provi-
sions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions
respecting the day of rest.",89 The Sherbert Court qualified its holding,
expressly rejecting "the existence of a constitutional right to unemploy-
ment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious convictions are
the cause of their unemployment.
'" 90
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion 9 also involved the denial of unemployment benefits to someone
who could not work for religious reasons. Eddie Thomas quit when he
was transferred from a position in the roll foundry to a position making
tank turrets.92 Making war materials contravened his religious beliefs,93
although a friend of his who was also a Jehovah's Witness did not feel
similar compunctions about the work.94 Thomas's application for unem-
ployment benefits was denied, because he lacked the necessary "good
cause" for the loss of his job.95
The Court held that "Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him
on the basis of the findings.., that he terminated his employment be-
cause of his religious convictions.,96 The fact that some Jehovah's Wit-
nesses might have had a different view of which work requirements were
religiously proscribed did not invalidate Thomas's view. "Intrafaith dif-
ferences ... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,
and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differ-
87. Id at 401 ("The appellee Employment Security Commission... found that appellant's
restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for
benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept 'suitable work when offered
.... '"1).
88. Id. at 404.
89. Id. at 410.
90. Id. at 409-10.
91. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
92. Id. at 709 ("Thomas terminated his employment in the Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery
Co. when he was transferred from the roll foundry to a department that produced turrets for military
tanks.").
93. Id. ("He claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production
of war materials.").
94. Id. at 711 ("[H]e consulted another Blaw-Knox employee-a friend and fellow Jehovah's
Witness [who] ... advised him that working on weapons parts at Blaw-Knox was not 'unscriptur-
al.'").
95. Id. at 712 ("The referee concluded nonetheless that Thomas' termination was not based
upon a 'good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work,' as required by the Indiana unemploy-
ment compensation statute." (alterations in original)).
96. Id. at 720.
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ences in relation to the Religion Clauses."97 While not ruling out that
certain claimed religious views might be considered beyond the pale,
98
the Court made clear both that the claim in the instant case was not one
of those" and that "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect."' ° Where the
asserted beliefs are sincerely held"0' and are not "so bizarre"'1 2 as to fail
to trigger First Amendment protection, the state is limited with respect to
the conditions it can place on people's actions based on religious faith.
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby put-
ting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. 
103
Both Sherbert and Thomas suggest that the state cannot condition
unemployment benefits upon an individual's sacrificing his or her sin-
cere religious beliefs by working.'°4 However, in Employment Division v.
Smith, 10 5 the Court suggested that those cases do not provide robust pro-
tections to conscience-based action extending beyond the unemployment
benefits context.1°6 The Smith Court noted that the "'exercise of religion'
often involves.., the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts,"'1 7 and explained that "a State would be 'prohibiting the free exer-
cise [of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display."'0 8 Thus, a state runs afoul of constitutional pro-
tections if it prohibits a practice because it is performed for religious
reasons. However, a practice that is prohibited whether or not performed
for religious reasons does not violate those free exercise guarantees.'0
9
97. Id. at 715.
98. Id. ("One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in
motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause .....
99. Id. ("[T]hat is not the case here .....
100. Id. at 716-17.
101. Cf United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.").
102. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
103. Id. at 717-18.
104. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) ("we
have never invalidated any govemmental action on the basis of the Sherbert est except the denial of
unemployment compensation."), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. (2014), as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651, 1655-56 (2011).
105. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
106. See id. at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally
applicable criminal law.").
107. Id. at 877.
108. Id. (alteration in original) (emphases added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
109. See id. at 879 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
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Thus, on the Court's interpretation, while regulations targeting religious
activity will be struck down absent compelling justification," 10 there is no
"constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability.""'
Smith has been roundly criticized, 12 although it has never been
overruled." 3 Yet, even without Smith, the Court has not afforded con-
science great constitutional protection, as Gillette illustrates.1 4 Con-
science, then, does not seem likely to yield a generalized exemption to
the requirements of neutral laws in the commercial context. Nonetheless,
because it might be argued that the First Amendment protects con-
science-based refusals to provide goods or services out of respect for the
freedom of association (and non-association), the Court's association
jurisprudence must also be examined.
D. Rights of Association
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"15 the Court explained that
there is "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."'" 16 At issue was
the refusal of the United States Jaycees to permit the local St. Paul and
Minneapolis chapters to admit women as regular members."17 After hav-
ing been notified that their charters might be revoked, "both [local] chap-
ters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights [alleging] that the exclusion of women from full member-
ship, required by the national organization's bylaws, violated the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act (Act).""' 8 The national organization claimed that
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' (quoting United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
110. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest." (citation omitted) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79)).
111. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997).
112. Marci A. Hamilton, Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 113, 121 (2009) ("Another broadly criticized Supreme Court decision is a religion case,
Employment Division v. Smith .... ").
113. Maureen E. Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World,
29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 497 (1998) ("Employment Division v. Smith is still good law, despite its many
critics.").
114. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
115. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
116. /d. at 618.
117. Id. at 614 ("In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of
directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of women. As a result, the two chapters
have been in violation of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years. The national organi-
zation has imposed a number of sanctions on the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the
bylaws, including denying their members eligibility for state or national office or awards programs,
and refusing to count their membership in computing votes at national conventions.").
118. Id.
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the members' constitutionally protected right to association was violated
by the Minnesota law."
9
The Roberts Court explained that although the national organization
and the local Jaycees chapters did distinguish on the basis of "age and
sex," 20 they were "large and basically unselective groups." 2 ' Lack of
selectivity notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless noted that there "can
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept mem-
bers it does not desire."'' 22 After all, a required modification of member-
ship might "impair the ability of the original members to express only
those views that brought them together."'' 23 That said, however, there was
no claim that the Act was being applied against the Jaycees to modify
their message.124
The Roberts Court minimized the burden that would be placed on
the Jaycees were they forced to admit women as regular members.
25
While it was possible that some "women members might have a different
view or agenda"'26 than would some men members, the Court was un-
willing to credit such a claim absent more support in the record.127 For
example, the Court was not confident that women would have a different
viewpoint "about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting
rights, and foreign relations.' 28 Finally, even if the Act's enforcement
''causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech,
that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State's legit-
imate purposes."'129 For this reason and because of the importance of the
state's interest, the Court rejected the Jaycees' association claims. 130
In her Roberts concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized an
aspect of the case that the Court did not explore. The Jaycees had been
construed as a business "in that it sells goods and extends privileges in
119. Id. at 612 ("This case requires us to address a conflict between a State's efforts to elimi-
nate gender-based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of association
asserted by members of a private organization.").
120. Id. at 621.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 623.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 624 ("Nor does the Jaycees contend that he Act has been applied in this case for the
purpose of hampering the organization's ability to express its views.").
125. See id. at 626 ("[T]he Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious
burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association." (citing Hishon v. King & Spal-
ding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984))).
126. Id. at 627.
127. Id. (noting that the change in view claim was not "supported by the record").
128. Id. at 627-28.
129. Id. at 628.
130. See id. at 623 ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.").
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exchange for annual membership dues."'131 She questioned the Court's
apparent position that "the Jaycees' right of association depends on the
organization's making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of un-
welcome members 'will change the message communicated by the
group's speech.""132 Her fear was that "certain commercial associations,
by engaging occasionally in certain kinds of expressive activities, might
improperly gain protection for discrimination."'1 33 Justice O'Connor be-
lieved that the Roberts majority opinion might be interpreted to grant
commercial entities more constitutional protection than they actually
have, because the "Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose em-
ployees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple
commercial transactions, without restraint from the State."',34 Thus, in her
view, commercial organizations simply do not enjoy the same kinds of
associational freedoms as do noncommercial organizations, and the
Court having used the same approach in this commercial context as it
would have used in a noncommercial context might mislead lower courts
with respect to the proper approach to be taken in such cases, correct
result in this particular case notwithstanding.
Basically, Justice O'Connor linked the protections afforded by the
Constitution to the kind of entity seeking protection. When an entity "en-
ters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the
complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it
confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.' 35 Entities primarily
engaged in commerce simply do not enjoy the protections that other enti-
ties might enjoy.
1 36
In the aforementioned cases, the Court has spelled out First
Amendment protections against state-required speech. The state cannot
require individuals to affirm principles in which they do not believe.
Symbolic conduct is not afforded the same degree of protection as is pure
speech, however, and the Court has given mixed signals with respect to
the degree of protection afforded to conscience-based activity. The next
section examines Supreme Court cases that have explored the degree to
which the First Amendment affords protection when claims involving
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are at issue.
131. Id. at 616.
132. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (majority opinion)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 634.
135. Id. at 636.
136. A separate issue involves the degree to which the First Amendment protects corporate
political speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) ("No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.").
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Il. ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
First Amendment guarantees involving expression, association, and
free exercise have been implicated in cases involving discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. The Court has not been consistent with
respect to the proper approach when constitutional values come into con-
flict, although the cases do suggest that commercial entities cannot im-
munize discriminatory practices by asserting First Amendment guaran-
tees.
A. Compelled Speech
The United States Supreme Court addressed the conflict between
First Amendment and equal protection values in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB).137 At issue
was whether First Amendment guarantees permitted those organizing the
annual Saint Patrick's Day Parade, the South Boston Allied War Veter-
ans Council, to preclude GLIB from marching in the parade.38 GLIB
was formed so that its members could march "in order to celebrate its
members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of
the Irish immigrants."'' 39 The parade organizers did not want the group to
march in the parade, although the reason for the exclusion was unclear.1
40
Differing reasons for the exclusion were offered at different times during
the trial, 141 and the trial court found that the reasons proffered were not
the real reasons anyway.142
Perhaps because of the difficulty associated with determining the
organizers' actual reasons, the Court decided to discuss some of the rea-
sons that might have motivated the parade organizers. The Court rea-
soned that a GLIB "contingent marching behind the organization's ban-
ner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbi-
an, or bisexual." 43 In addition, permitting GLIB to march might be per-
ceived as lending support to GLIB's "view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as het-
erosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around oth-
137. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
138. Id. at 559-60.
139. Id. at 570.
140. For example, the trial court judge had found that the exclusion was based on the group
members' sexual orientation. See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. (GLIB) v.
City of Bos., 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Mass. 1994) ("The judge found that GLIB was excluded from
the parade because of the sexual orientation of its members."), rev 'd, Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
There had been testimony that the group had been excluded because of the unsubstantiated belief
that the group's members were also members of Act-Up and Queer Nation and that they might
become disorderly. Id. at 1295 n.8.
141. Id. at 1295 ("At trial, Hurley 'equivocated about his reasons for excluding GLIB' but
ultimately testified that he would never allow them to march in the parade.").
142. Id. ("The judge concluded that the inconsistent and changing explanations for excluding
GLIB demonstrated the 'pretextual nature' of those explanations.").
143. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
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er identifying characteristics."'44 The march organizers might have had a
different view; for example, they "may not [have] believe[d] these facts
about Irish sexuality to be so.' 145 Or, even if the organizers realized that
some GLIB members were of Irish descent, the organizers might none-
theless have "object[ed] to unqualified social acceptance of gays and
lesbians or [might] have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's
message out of the parade."'146 Perhaps the Council feared that permitting
GLIB to participate would be perceived as a Council endorsement that
GLIB's "message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of sup-
port as well."'
147
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that GLIB
must be included in the parade."48 That holding was based in part on a
finding that the parade had no expressive purpose,149 both because so
many divergent viewpoints were represented in the parade50 and because
of the Council's nonselectivity-"in essence, almost any individual or
group would be admitted to the parade if they either apply or show up at
the start of the parade and offer to make a contribution to the council.''
Indeed, the trial judge had found that "since 1947 the only groups that
have been excluded from the Parade besides GLIB have been the Ku
Klux Klan and ROAR (Restore our Alienated Rights) [an anti busing
group].' 52
The United States Supreme Court rejected the approach taken by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, explaining that "the word
'parade'... indicate[s] marchers who are making some sort of collective
point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.' 53 In this
case, it was not entirely clear what that point was, since "the Council
[was] rather lenient in admitting participants. ' 54 Nonetheless, the lack of
a clearly defined message did not mean that there was no message at
144. Id.
145. Id
146. Id. at 574-75.
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id. at 563-64.
149. See id. at 564 (discussing the Massachusetts court's view that "it was impossible to detect
an expressive purpose in the parade"); see also GLIB, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1300(Mass. 1994)
("[T]here was no error in his finding that the parade was not used by the council for expressive
purposes, and that, as a result, the defendants could not cloak their discriminatory acts in the mantle
of the First Amendment."), rev'd, Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
150. See GLIB, 636 N.E.2d at 1296 n.9.
151. Id. at 1298.
152. Id. at 1296. But see id. at 1296 n.10 (noting the council's claim that "the Massachusetts
Right to Life group and a truck carrying antihomosexual signs also were excluded").
153. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
154. Id. at 569; see also GLIB, 636 N.E.2d at 1296 (noting the trial court's finding that there
were "no written procedures, criteria, or standards for selecting participants or sponsors of the pa-
rade").
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all.'55 Further, even if there was no particular message that the Council
wished to express, there may have been messages that the Council
wished to refrain from expressing.156 The Court explained that "when
dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker
intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's
right to autonomy over the message is compromised."
57
Certainly, there are other ways for speakers to disassociate them-
selves from particular messages. For example, individuals may post signs
disavowing approval or disapproval of a particular position,58 although
"such disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade.' 59 Not
only was there "no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow
'any identity of viewpoint' between themselves and the selected partici-
pants" in a parade like this,16° but choosing to do this for one marcher in
the parade would raise questions about which other views were implicitly
being authorized or disavowed. Thus, if there were someone marching
immediately in front of GLIB disavowing the inference that the Council
agreed or disagreed with any particular group's message, then bystanders
might wonder whether that meant that the Council was implicitly endors-
ing all of the other groups or, perhaps, was also disavowing the messages
of those groups following GLIB.
The Council could instead have had someone marching at the head
of the parade holding a disclaimer sign indicating that the views ex-
pressed by individual marchers did not necessarily reflect those of the
organizers. That way, there would be no implication that the disclaimer
applied to one marching group in particular. However, such a disclaimer
might well be missed by parade watchers who arrived late or were mo-
mentarily distracted, thereby undermining the disclaimer's intended ef-
fect.'
61
155. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70 ("But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protec-
tion simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.").
156. See id. at 573 ("[T]his general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech,
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact
the speaker would rather avoid . (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
341-42 (1995))).
157. Id. at 576.
158. Cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) ("[A]ppellants can ex-
pressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the
speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the mes-
sage and could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state
law.").
159. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77.
160. Id. at 576.
161. Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("Because the broadcast audience is
constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content.").
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The Hurley Court emphasized that noncommercial speech was at is-
sue, 162 and treated the restriction as "amount[ing] to nothing less than a
proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.'63 Such a
proposal was incompatible with First Amendment protections.164 Be-
cause parades are not only "a form of expression"''65 but also have "in-
herent expressiveness,"'66 and because "the Council clearly decided to
exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose to
make," 1 67 the First Amendment precluded Massachusetts from forcing a
private group to change its message by requiring GLIB's message to be
expressed.
While a straightforward reading of Hurley is that the First Amend-
ment precludes the state from forcing private entities to modify their
message absent compelling justification, there are other ways to read the
opinion. For example, Hurley might be read as permitting or even en-
dorsing orientation-based animus.168 Because virtually no other groups
had been excluded from marching in the parade, the Court's upholding
this exclusion might be read to suggest that the Court believed that there
was something peculiarly objectionable about this particular group.
69
Whether orientation was appropriately subject to disadvantageous treat-
ment was one of the issues discussed in Romer v. Evans.
170
B. Orientation and Association
While Romer was decided on equal protection grounds,71 the state
had asserted the protection of association rights as a justification for the
ballot measure.72 At issue was a Colorado amendment designed to with-
draw antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sexual orientation.1
3
162. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579 ("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used
to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the
First Amendment .... ").
163. Id. ("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amend-
ment .... ").
164. Id. ("The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis.").
165. Id. at 568.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 574.
168. See Catherine Connolly, Gay Rights in Wyoming. A Review of Federal and State Law, II
WYO. L, REV. 125, 135 n.57 (2011) (reading Hurley to "permit discriminatory animus regarding
LGBT individuals and groups"). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming
Out ": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106
YALE L.J. 2411, 2459 (1997) ("More realistically, there is no reason to believe the Council ever had
a message, and some reason to think they were simply excluding GLIB because of antihomosexual
animus ...").
169. Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) ("[T]he purpose of the St. Pat-
tick's Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held that
the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonetheless." (emphasis added)).
170. 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996).
171. Id. at 635-36 ("Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause . .
172. Id. at 635.
173. The amendment was titled "No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisex-
ual Orientation" and provided as follows:
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The Court noted that the "amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but
no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimi-
nation, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies."
' 174
When striking down the amendment, the Court reasoned that "laws
of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disad-
vantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affect-
ed."175 The state had sought to justify the amendment by saying that it
represented "respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religious objections to homosexuality."'' 76 In rejecting that this purpose
could justify the amendment's enactment, the Court reasoned that
"Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative
end but to make them unequal to everyone else."
' 177
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that sexual orientation not only
could "be singled out for disfavorable treatment,"'' 7 8 but also that it al-
ready had been in Bowers v. Hardwick.179 Even worse in Justice Scalia's
eyes was the Court's implicit message that "opposition to homosexuality
is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."' 80 Rather than contest that
the amendment was animus-based, Justice Scalia instead dissented from
the proposition that "'animosity' toward homosexuality is evil." 18, He
would have upheld the amendment precisely because it was allegedly
based on "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct."'
' 82
Romer seems to stand for the proposition that orientation-based an-
imus, whether understood as "a Kulturkampf" 83 or, instead, "a fit of
spite, ' 84 does not survive even rational basis review.'85 However, such a
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. I, § 30b, held unconstitutional by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996)).
174. Id. at 627.
175. Id. at 634.
176. Id. at 635.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See id. ("[T]he Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years
ago .... " (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003))).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 644.
183. See id. at 636. For a brief definition of Kulturkampf, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, Justice
Scalia and the Art of Rhetoric, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 287, 290 n.19 (2012) (.'Kulturkampf' trans-
lates literally as 'culture struggle.' The phrase was originally used as a political slogan in reference
to the ongoing struggle that occurred in the 1870s between the Roman Catholic Church and the
German government for control over school and church appointments and civil marriage.").
184. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conclusion might have been thought premature 16 after the Court issuedBoy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale'8 7 five years later.
At issue in Dale was whether the Boy Scouts had violated New Jer-
sey's public accommodation law188 when precluding James Dale from
being a scoutmaster once the organization had discovered that he was
gay.Is9 The Dale Court reasoned that the "forced inclusion of an unwant-
ed person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive associa-
tion if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."''90 After finding that
"the Boy Scouts [of America] engages in expressive activity,"' 91 the
Court set out to determine whether the inclusion of Dale would modify
the Scouts' message. The Court explained, "As we give deference to an
association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must
also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression."'92 Yet, the Roberts Court had refused to defer to the Jaycees
about what would impair that organization's message,193 so the Court's
commitment to deference was hardly as established as the Dale Court
had implied.
The Dale Court denied that "an expressive association can erect a
shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere ac-
ceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its mes-
sage."'194 Such a denial would seem to have disposed of the case, because
Monmouth Council Executive James Kay had expressly stated in writing
185. See id. at 635 (majority opinion) ("We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective."); see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence
Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation Defamation, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 125, 137 (2012) ("Romer v. Evans was the Supreme Court's first authoritative statement that
the entanglement of state action with anti-LGBT animus is constitutionally impermissible.").
186. -Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Lesbian and
Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 610-11 (2001) ("Dale sanctioned the mar-
ginalization of gay people through the First Amendment .... Some have called anti-gay animus the
last socially acceptable form of prejudice existing today.").
187. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
188. Id. at 644 ("The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey's public accommoda-
tions law requires that the Boy Scouts readmit Dale.").
189. Id. ("Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose adult membership in the Boy
Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an avowed homosexual .... "); see also
id. at 645 ("Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive James Kay revoking his adult
membership. Dale wrote to Kay requesting the reason for Monmouth Council's decision. Kay re-
sponded by letter that the Boy Scouts 'specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."').
190. Id. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
191. Id. at 650.
192. Id. at 653 (citing Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 123-24 (1981)).
193. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435,
1471 (2004) ("Nor did Brennan's opinion for the Court in Roberts do what Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court subsequently did in Boy Scouts: simply defer to the Jaycees' claims that being forced to
admit women would impair their expression or impede their ability to disseminate their views or
message.").
194. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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that the Boy Scouts "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."
1 95
This meant that Dale's orientation rather than the fact that he had been a
co-president of a gay and lesbian organization while at college 96 was the
decisive factor. For example, his Scouts membership presumably would
not have been revoked if he had been straight and a co-president of a
Gay-Straight Alliance.197 Nonetheless, the Court held that the New Jer-
sey public accommodations law violated the Boy Scouts' "rights to free-
dom of expressive association."'
' 98
The Court's position became even more confused and confusing
when it cited Hurley for support, explaining that the Saint Patrick's Day
Parade organizers "did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because
of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a
GLIB banner."'99 After distinguishing between an orientation-based and
a message-based exclusion, the Dale Court continued,
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day [P]arade
would have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to pro-
pound a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant
scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scouts'
choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.
2
00
But it was not as if Dale was carrying a banner saying that he was gay or
even saying that he supported gay rights. Rather, he was being rejected
because he was gay. Ironically, Dale could have marched in the Saint
Patrick's Day Parade (as long as he marched, say, with the ACLU rather
than with GLIB), but could not be an assistant scoutmaster.
Suppose that a straight man actively supported gay rights. He, too,
would not be permitted to be a scoutmaster if he expressed that position
to the youth in his troop.20' Dale had not been accused of having said
anything inappropriate to the Scouts, however, so such a point was not
relevant to the case at hand.20 2
The Dale Court implied that because Dale was a gay rights activist
outside of the Scouts,203 permitting him to be a scout leader would impair
the Boy Scouts' message. But suppose a straight scout leader advocated
195. Id. at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. See id. at 653.
197. See Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More FAIR: On CLS v. Martinez and First
Amendment Jurisprudence, II FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 235, 267 (2012) ("[H]ad Dale been President
of a Gay-Straight Alliance at Rutgers, he could have continued to be a Scout leader as long as he
self-identified as having a different-sex orientation.").
198. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
199. Id. at 653.
200. Id. at 654.
201. See id. at 655 n.l.
202. See id. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("BSA has not contended, nor does the record
support, that Dale had ever advocated a view on homosexuality to his troop .... ).
203. Id. at 653 (majority opinion) ("Dale... remains a gay rights activist.").
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for gay rights outside of the Scouts. Permitting that person to be a Scout
would presumably impair the Boy Scout message as well, although the
204Scouts would not have expelled such a person.
The Dale Court understood that the Boy Scouts' willingness to con-
tinue to employ a straight man dissenting from their sexual orientation
policy would seem to undercut their alleged worry about keeping em-
ployees on message. But the Court was unpersuaded that the Scout's
willingness to employ a straight supporter of gay rights established that
the organization was discriminating on the basis of orientation. "The
presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as dis-
agreeing with Boy Scouts policy. ' 205 The Court conveniently ignored the
Boy Scouts' express admission that it would prohibit non-activists who
were gay from being scoutmasters206 and that it would permit activists
who were not gay to be scoutmasters. The Court's emphasis on message
rather than orientation was both disingenuous20 7 and unpersuasive.208
The Dale analysis is "disappointing,' ' ° at least in part, because the
Court treated the Boy Scouts' policy as if it only precluded gay activists
from being members when it expressly discriminated on the basis of ori-
entation. An additional noteworthy element of the Dale opinion is that
the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts' assessment of whether its message
would be altered by permitting a nondesired person to be a member when
the Court had not been at all deferential in Roberts. One explanation for
the differing degree of deference in the two cases is to say that the Court
disapproved of discrimination on the basis of sex210 but approved of dis-
crimination based on orientation,211 although a different explanation em-
phasizes that the Jaycees were viewed as commercial and the Boy Scouts
204. Id. at 691 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 655-56 (majority opinion).
206. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting that "homosexuals" could not be
Scouts).
207. See Suzanna Sherry, Warning: Labeling Constitutions May Be Hazardous to Your Re-
gime, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (2004) ("[T]here is the disingenuous way in which the
Court identified both the organization's message and the effect that retaining Dale as a scoutmaster
would have on that message.").
208. Cf Strasser, supra note 197, at 268 ("Dale modifies right to association jurisprudence
while claiming to follow it.").
209. See Scott Kelly, Note, Scouts' (Dis)Honor: The Supreme Court Allows the Boy Scouts of
America to Discriminate Against Homosexuals in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
243, 244 (2002).
210. Cf James A. Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral Code Does Not Trigger a Religious
Institution's Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 440 (2012) ("Regarding the judicial
branch, someone arguing that prohibiting gender discrimination is a 'fundamental national public
policy' would undoubtedly start with Roberts v. United States Jaycees.").
211. See Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment ofCLS v. Martinez,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 637 (2011) (describing Hurley and Dale as "recent First Amend-
ment decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that favored discrimination against gays over nondis-
crimination").
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212were not. Yet another explanation is that the Court had a change of
heart and now believed that great deference was due to an organization's
judgment about when its own message might be altered. The deference-
to-the-organization's-judgment explanation was subsequently refuted in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR)."'
At issue in FAIR was the constitutionality of the Solomon Amend-
ment,214 which specified that "if any part of an institution of higher edu-
cation denies military recruiters access equal to that provided other re-
cruiters, the entire institution would lose certain federal funds. ,21 5 FAIR,
an association of law schools and law faculties,216 "argued that this
forced inclusion and equal treatment of military recruiters violated the
law schools' First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.,
217
At the time, the military banned gays from serving in the armed
218forces. Because FAIR members had "adopted policies expressing their
opposition to discrimination based on, among other factors, sexual orien-
tation,,219 law schools were put in a bind. They had "to choose between
exercising their First Amendment right to decide whether to disseminate
or accommodate a military recruiter's message, and ensuring the availa-
bility of federal funding for their universities.22°
The Court suggested both that "Congress has broad authority to leg-
islate on matters of military recruiting"221 and that Congress could have
directly imposed access requirements had it so desired.222 The Court then
reasoned that because Congress could have imposed the requirement
directly, it obviously was permitted to adopt the indirect method that it in
fact chose.2 23 But this reasoning is incorrect if only because the First
Amendment may be implicated in one method but not in the other. If
Congress had directly imposed such a requirement, then it would be un-
likely that students would impute the discriminatory policy to the Uni-
224versity. If, however, a university chose to ignore its own policy so that
212. See Fleming, supra note 193, at 1472 ("[O]ne might argue that there is a difference in the
character of the freedom of association: that the Jaycees were engaged in commercial association,
while the Boy Scouts were involved in civic association ... .
213. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
214. Id. at 51 ("The law schools responded by suing, alleging that the Solomon Amendment
infringed their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.").
215. Id.; see 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West 2013).
216. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52.
217. Id. at 53.
218. See id. at 52 n.1 ("[A] person generally may not serve in the Armed Forces if he has
engaged in homosexual acts, stated that he is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.").
219. Id. at 52.
220. Id at 53.
221. Id. at 58.
222. Id. at 60 ("[T]he First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the
Solomon Amendment's access requirement . .
223. See id.
224. Ironically, the Court recognized this point but somehow believed that it cut the other way.
See id at 65 ("We have held that high school students can appreciate the difference between speech
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it would not lose federal funds, then the university would be more likely
to have a message imputed to it, e.g., that it did not take its own nondis-S 225
crimination policy seriously, depending perhaps upon how much mon-ey was at stake.226
The FAIR Court was not at all deferential to the law schools' judg-
ment that they were being forced to support a message with which they
disagreed-the Court simply announced that "accommodation of a mili-
tary recruiter's message is not compelled speech because the accommo-
dation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school.227
The Court explained, "Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools
agree with any speech by recruiters,"228 notwithstanding that nonmilitary
recruiters with a similar policy would not have been allowed to recruit on
229campus.
To support the claim that law schools were not being forced by the
Solomon Amendment to modify their own messages, the FAIR Court
emphasized that "nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the
law schools may say about the military's policies. '230 Thus, a school
could post a sign saying that the military's policy should not be attributed
to the school or, perhaps, that the school affirmatively disagreed with the
military's discriminatory policy. But suppose that the law school did not
believe that such signs would be effective.231 That did not matter, be-
cause the law schools were mistaken in thinking that they were being
forced to speak at all-"accommodating the military's message does not
a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally required to do so .... " (citing Bd.
of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion))).
225. Some commentators seem not to appreciate that the fact that a university has a choice
makes it more rather than less likely that a message will be imputed to it based on the choice made.
See James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take
Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 988 (2011) (reasoning that an
important distinction between FAIR and cases where public accommodations laws require compli-
ance "is that schools had a choice to continue their educational mission without interference by
simply forfeiting federal funding").
226. Cf Major Charles G. Kels, Free Speech and the Military Recruiter: Reaffirming the
Marketplace of Ideas, II NEV. L.J. 92, 127 (2010) ("FAIR called the amount of money at stake-an
estimated $400 million annually in the case of Harvard University-'a fiscal gun at the University's
head."' (footnote omitted)); John Curran, Vt. Law School to Accept Military Recruiters, TIMES
ARGuS (MONTPELIER-BARRE, VT.), Aug. 15, 2011 ("Vermont Law School and ... the William
Mitchell College of Law ... were the only ones in America that barred the recruiters despite a meas-
ure known as the Solomon Amendment .... Both are independent law schools unaffiliated with
larger universities or state institutions, which allowed them to stand on principle without costing
affiliated schools millions of federal dollars for scientific research and other academic pursuits.").
227. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
228. Id. at 65.
229. Cf id. at 58 ("It is insufficient for a law school to treat the military as it treats all other
employers who violate its nondiscrimination policy. Under the statute, military recruiters must be
given the same access as recruiters who comply with the policy.").
230. Id. at 65.
231. Cf supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing why a disavowal might not be
effective in the context of a parade).
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affect the law schools' speech, because the schools are not speaking
when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.,
232
The FAIR Court also addressed whether "the expressive nature of
the conduct regulated by the statute brings that conduct within the First
Amendment's protection.,233 Citing O'Brien, the Court noted that "some
forms of 'symbolic speech' [a]re deserving of First Amendment protec-
tion, 234 but then reaffirmed its rejection of "the view that 'conduct can
be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.''2 35 Instead, the "First Amendment [extends]
protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive.
'" 236
An important question, then, is which behaviors are inherently ex-
pressive. The Court explained why the conduct at issue did not qualify.
"An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the
law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing
its disapproval of the military, all the law school's interview rooms are
full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they
would rather interview someplace else."237 The observer would not know
that the law school was making a statement by having the recruiting
elsewhere unless the law school had made a statement about it.238 "The
fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the
conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants pro-
tection under O'Brien."239 Nor should it be thought that combining
speech with conduct would transform the conduct into expression. "If
combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive con-
duct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 'speech'
simply by talking about it."240 Furthermore, there would be undesirable
consequences if expressive conduct were viewed more expansively. For
example, "if an individual announces that he intends to express his dis-
approval of the Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income
taxes, [the Court] would have to apply O'Brien to determine whether the
Tax Code violates the First Amendment."241 Needless to say, the Court
242would not treat such a protest as expressive conduct. Nor for that mat-
ter has the Court been willing to recognize a constitutional right to avoid
232. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
233. Id. at 65.
234. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
235. Id. at 65-66 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
236. Id. at 66.
237. Id.
238. Id. ("The expressive component of a law school's actions is not created by the conduct
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paying taxes even if doing so violates sincerely held religious beliefs.43
In United States v. Lee, 244 the Court explained, "When followers of a
particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the
limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and
faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity."
245
The FAIR Court also addressed whether the Solomon Amendment
"violates law schools' freedom of expressive association.'" 246 Dispensing
with that challenge rather quickly, the Court noted that "[s]tudents and
faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's
message.247 Because that was so, a "military recruiter's mere presence
on campus does not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless
of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message."
2 48
The Court's analysis of First Amendment freedoms in the orienta-
tion discrimination context is not free from interpretive difficulty. Some-
times the Court seems to weigh rights to expression and freedom of asso-
ciation more heavily than at other times.249 Further, the Court has been
inconsistent with respect to the degree to which it would give deference
to an organization's judgment that unwanted association would change
that organization's message. Nonetheless, the Court has embraced at
least two principles applicable to the kind of conscience-based activity
envisioned in this Article: (1) commercial organizations do not have the
same association rights as do noncommercial organizations, and (2)
symbolic activity that requires explanation to be understood may well not
trigger the First Amendment protections for expressive conduct. The
current jurisprudence makes clear how a case like Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock 25 should be decided.
C. Elane Photography v. Willock
At issue in Willock was a refusal by Elane Photography to photo-
graph the commitment ceremony of Vanessa Willock and her same-sex
partner, because the owners did not wish to "convey the message that
marriage can be defined to include combinations of people other than the
243. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
244. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
245. Id. at 261.
246. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68.
247. Id. at 69-70.
248. Id. at 70.
249. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (holding that the University
of California, Hastings College of Law could maintain a limited purpose public forum requiring that
all student clubs receiving official university recognition admit all students regardless of religion or
sexual orientation).
250. 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
251. Id. at 432 ("This appeal arose from the refusal of Elane Photography, LLC (Elane Photog-
raphy), to photograph the commitment ceremony of Vanessa Willock (Willock) and her same-sex
partner (Partner).").
[Vol. 91:2
THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S ORIENTATION
union of one man and one woman.' '252 The New Mexico appellate court
hearing the case affirmed the lower court decision that he refusal was in
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act.253
Elane Photography is a commercial enterprise that "primarily pho-
tographs significant life events such as weddings and graduations.' '254 It
advertises "its services through its website, advertisements on multiple
search engines, and in the Yellow Pages.,255 Nonetheless, Elane Photog-
raphy argued that it is not a public accommodation for purposes of the
New Mexico law.256 The appellate court rejected that contention, at least
in part, because Elane Photography "advertises its services to the public
at large, and anyone who wants to access Elane Photography's website
may do So.",
2 57
Elane Photography denied that it was discriminating on the basis of
orientation, arguing that it would have taken portrait photographs of
Willock 258 and would have been willing to photograph a different-sex
wedding even if one or both of the participants had a same-sex orienta-
tion. 9 So, too, Elane Photography might have noted that it would have
refused to photograph two straight men or two straight women who
wished to commission a commitment ceremony photograph.26 Yet, such
a policy of refusing to photograph two people of the same sex in a com-
mitment ceremony is "directed toward gay persons as a class,"261 because
"the conduct targeted by this law [the NMHRA] is conduct that is closely
correlated with being homosexual.,262 Thus, it is unlikely that many
straight individuals would wish to participate in a commitment ceremo-
263ny, and the mere possibility that straight people might desire such a
photograph would not undermine that the policy was directed towards
those with a same-sex orientation. As a separate matter, the defense to
the orientation discrimination claim would be that Elane Photography's





256. Id. at 433.
257. Id. at 436.
258. See id. at 437.
259. See id. ("Elane Photography would photograph opposite-sex weddings between persons of
any sexual orientation.").
260. See Gottry, supra note 225, at 984 ("Elane Photography would agree to photograph a
traditional wedding between a lesbian woman and gay man, and would refuse to photograph a same-
sex commitment ceremony between two straight men.").
261. Willock, 284 P.3d at 437 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
262. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Willock, 284 P.3d at 437
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583).
263. See Scott Titshaw, The Reactionary Road to Free Love: How DOMA, State Marriage
Amendments, and Social Conservatives Undermine Traditional Marriage, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 205,
233 (2012) (noting that most "heterosexual men and women... would not be tempted to enter a
marriage with someone of the same sex").
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ination on the basis of sex was also precluded by the New Mexico public
accommodations law.26
Once determining that the refusal to photograph Willock and her
partner was in violation of the law, the New Mexico court then examined
whether application of the public accommodations act "violate[d] Elane
Photography's freedom of expression protected by the federal and state
constitutions.265 The court noted that "the mere fact that a business pro-
vides a good or service with a recognized expressive element does not
allow the business to engage in discriminatory practices."266 Citing FAIR
for support, the Willock court explained that "Elane Photography's com-
mercial business conduct, taking photographs for hire, is not so inherent-
ly expressive as to warrant First Amendment protections."
267
When discussing the degree to which commercial business conduct
is expressive, one might focus on whether the good or service itself is
"'artistic' and 'personally expressive' ,268 or on the degree to which the
refusal to provide the good or service is "inherently expressive. " 269 These
differing possible points of focus suggest that at least three distinct issues
might be addressed when analyzing whether a conscience-exemption
policy for commercial entities must be afforded: (1) which goods or ser-
vices qualify as artistic or personally expressive?; (2) in what ways can
conscience-based exemptions be limited without violating constitutional
guarantees?; and (3) under what conditions, if any, should the forced
provision of a good or service be thought to communicate a message of
which the provider disapproves?
1. Goods or Services that Qualify as Artistic or Personally Expres-
sive
The difficulty in applying this criterion is not that commercial pho-
tographers fail to engage in artistic or personally expressive work but,
rather, that affording an exemption on that basis would be very difficult
to cabin. Many individuals (rightly) view their jobs as artistic or person-
ally expressive, because those occupations require the use of judgment or
264. See Willock, 284 P.3d at 433.
265. Id. at 438.
266. Id. at 439 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)); cf Jennifer Ann
Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not Discriminate: A Proposal for Limiting First Amendment De-
fenses to Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 12 SCHOLAR 585, 597 (2010) ("Hurley may be
distinguished from Elane Photography in that the Veterans Council was a private organization
engaged in an act of free speech and association, whereas Elane Photography is a business that offers
its services to the public.").
267. Willock, 284 P.3d at 439.
268. See Gottry, supra note 225, at 979 ("Elaine is a trained professional photographer who
approaches her work with a photojournalist style, which she considers both 'artistic' and 'personally
expressive."').
269. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.
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creativity.270 Anyone who makes goods might be thought to engage in an
artistic endeavor.271 In addition, a vast array of individuals providing
services can plausibly claim that they are also engaged in providing artis-
tic or expressive services. One commentator has suggested that such a
policy might result in "endless litigation and factual analysis of what
types of businesses are expressive.,
272
Recognizing an exemption to public accommodations statutes for
individuals who perform artistic or expressive conduct would likely af-
ford such a wide-ranging exemption that the central purpose behind pub-
lic accommodation laws-the "elimination of discrimination"273-would
be severely undermined, if not gutted. While one might believe such a
27result welcome, 4 those supporting the purposes behind public accom-
modation laws might well fear that the creation of such an "exception
could swallow the general rule.,
275
2. What Counts as Offensive to Conscience
Suppose that an individual claims that her conscience is offended by
being forced to do something that she believes promotes a message of
which she disapproves. Must such a claim be accepted or are there some
claims of conscience that need not be given effect?
The Thomas Court suggested that certain religious beliefs are "so
276bizarre" as not to be afforded constitutional protection. Very few be-
liefs would fall into that category, however.217 For example in United
States v. Ballard,278 the Court reviewed a mail fraud conviction.27 9 The
defendants had claimed to have "the ability and power to cure persons of
those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which
are ordinarily classified by the medical profession as being incurable
270. Cf Daniel E. Eaton, Writers Gone Wild: "The Muse Made Me Do It" as a Defense to a
Claim of Sexual Harassment, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 8 n.54 (2004) (discussing "the inherently
creative nature of many occupations not generally considered 'creative,' but require the same kind of
creative freedom considered indispensable in the arts"); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional
Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 139 (2000) (noting that
"the line between expressive and nonexpressive organizations does not leap out").
271. See Nabet, supra note 51, at 1550 (discussing "the vast array of artistic businesses that are
potentially expressive").
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1535.
274. Cf Karen L. Dayton, Note, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination Weighs the Balance Between the First Amendment and the State's Compelling Inter-
est in Eradicating Discrimination, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 399 n.101 (1999) ("Tennessee and
South Carolina even went so far as to repeal their state public accommodation laws, which left
businesses with the complete freedom to choose their customers.").
275. Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044(2013).
276. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
277. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). For discussion of Ballard, see infra
notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
278. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
279. Id. at 79 ("Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the
mails to defraud.").
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diseases."280 These "religious doctrines or beliefs"'28' were asserted to
convince others to contribute "money, property, and other things of val-
ue'' 282 to the defendants.
While members of the Ballard Court rejected that the defendants
actually had the powers in question,283 the Court held that the Constitu-
tion precluded the jury from deciding that issue.28 4 The only question that
could be submitted to the jury without offending constitutional guaran-
tees was the sincerity of the defendants' beliefs,285 i.e., whether the de-
fendants sincerely believed that they had the asserted powers. Thus, even
the claims at issue in Ballard were not sufficiently "bizarre" to fail to
trigger First Amendment protection. 286 Further, as the Thomas Court
made clear, unanimity of belief among sect members is not required for
287beliefs to qualify as religious and deserving protection.
Some commentators would permit exemptions for individuals for
whom providing a service would violate sincerely held religious beliefs
but not for individuals for whom providing a service would violate sin-
cerely held moral beliefs.288 Seeger and Welch suggest that such a dis-
tinction might well be constitutionally problematic.28 9 Further, given the
great latitude afforded to claims that certain actions contravene sincere
religious beliefs, distinguishing between religious and moral compunc-
tions would likely do little if any work, even if constitutionally permissi-
ble. An objector could always claim (and might well sincerely believe)
that his or her compunctions were religious rather than "merely" moral.
Other commentators equate religious and moral compunctions and
suggest that to say that "the owners of Elane Photography can honor their
consciences by keeping their moral beliefs out of the marketplace ignores
the external orientation of conscience: conscientia refers to moral belief
280. Id. at 80.
281. Id. at 84.
282. Id. at 80.
283. Id. at 87 ("The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people."); id at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I can see in their teachings
nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.").
284. See id at 86 (majority opinion) ("[W]e do not agree that he truth or verity of respondents'
religious doctrines or beliefs hould have been submitted to the jury.").
285. Id. at 91-92 ("[l]t was agreed at the outset of the trial, without objection from the defend-
ants, that only the issue of respondents' good faith belief in the representations of religious experi-
ences would be submitted to the jury.... On the issue submitted to the jury in this case it properly
rendered a verdict of guilty.").
286. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Some
have religious scruples against eating pork. Those scruples, no matter how bizarre they might seem
to some, are within the ambit of the First Amendment.") (citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87).
287. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
288. See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Jana Singer, Same-Sex Marriage and Conscience Exemp-
tions, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS 12, 17 (2011). Professor Wilson explained:
"[Olur proposed exemption is limited to religious objections for a reason. I think personally that if
we allow exemptions to the celebration of same-sex marriage for moral reasons, that would encom-
pass people having moral objections to homosexuality, which is not something I can support." Id.
289. See id.; supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
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applied to conduct.,290 But adopting a principle affording a blanket ex-
emption on matters of conscience would recognize a whole host of ex-
emptions unless the principle could be limited in some non-question-
begging way. For example, such a justification would permit people to
object to a whole host of marriages-interreligious, intergenerational, or
interracial marriages-as long as the objectors sincerely believed that
291
such unions violated religious precepts.
Some commentators claim that the way to cabin the exemptions is
to refuse to give them effect if there is a moral consensus that the dis-
crimination at issue, e.g., racial discrimination, is wrong.292 But that
means that if there is a moral consensus that orientation discrimination is
wrong, then such discrimination will also not be permitted.293
In any event, we should not be deciding which dictates of con-
science to respect in light of whether there is general agreement with the
contents of those beliefs rather than in light of the secular state interests
implicated in affording protection to those beliefs.294 In School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,295 the Court suggested:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as le-
gal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to... freedom
of worship.., and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
296
290. Robert K. Vischer, Commentary, How Necessary Is the Right ofAssembly?, 89 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2012).
291. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (school denied tax exemption
because of its refusal on religious grounds to permit students in interracial relationships to matricu-
late).
292. See Chad Flanders, Book Review, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 567, 570 (2009-2010) (reviewing
ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN
PERSON AND STATE (2009)) ("Vischer also says that we have reached a moral consensus that associ-
ations should not be able to discriminate on the basis of race but not on whether they should be able
to discriminate based on sexual orientation."); cf Abodeely, supra note 266, at 589 ("If the facts of
the case were different and Elane Photography refused to photograph a Jewish wedding or an inter-
racial wedding, even if those unions were against Huguenin's faith, there would be no question that
the business could not legally discriminate based on customers' race or religion.").
293. Cf Flanders, supra note 292, at 570-71 (noting that some will disagree with Vischer,
presumably with respect to whether a consensus has already been reached that orientation discrimi-
nation is unacceptable).
294. Cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("But it is
a strange Bill of Rights that makes it possible for the dominant religious group to bring the minority
to heel because the minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically are wholesome and not antiso-
cial, does not defer to the majority's religious beliefs.").
295. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
296. Id. at 226 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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The right to act in accord with conscience is not absolute297 But
the test for whether such conduct is permissible simply cannot be wheth-
er it happens to be in accord with majority preferences.298 It is precisely
for this reason that the Gillette Court discussed whether there were "valid
neutral [secular] reasons' 299 for rejecting a claim of conscience rather
than whether there was some consensus about the relative justness of the
Vietnam War.
300
3. When Does the Provision of a Good or Service Constitute Ac-
ceptance or Endorsement?
Elane Photography refused to photograph Willock's commitment
ceremony because that business did not want to express approval of
same-sex marriage.3° 1 An important issue for the Court has involved the
conditions under which particular conduct might be thought to express a
view contravening the actor's beliefs. Those cases have ranged from
saluting the flag,302 to displaying something on a license plate,303 to per-
mitting individuals to be scoutmasters,304 to permitting the military to
interview on campus in contravention of a nondiscrimination policy.305
Consider the individual who sees a photographer refusing to photo-
graph a particular couple. The observer would not know whether that
refusal was due to a scheduling conflict, an inability to agree about price,
306or some other reason, especially if there is a public accommodations
ordinance requiring commercial establishments not to discriminate. Be-
cause it would be unlikely for an observer to impute a particular view to
the photographer, the United States Supreme Court would reject that this
would be a case of compelled speech, just as the FAIR Court rejected that
law schools were being compelled to speak.30 7 Further, as was true in
FAIR, taking the photograph would in no way impede Elane Photog-
297. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[Tlhe Amendment embraces
two concepts, [] freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.").
298. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh
impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups ..... "), superseded by
statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2014),
as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655-56 (2011).
299. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971).
300. For discussion of Gillette, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
301. See Gottry, supra note 225, at 963-64 (arguing that she was being forced "to communi-
cate a particular message about same-sex commitment ceremonies-was compelled to express a
viewpoint she disagreed with, in violation of her First Amendment free speech rights").
302. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 187-212 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 213-49 and accompanying text.
306. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 439-40 (N.M. Ct. App.
2012) ("[A]n observer who merely sees Elane Photography photographing a same-sex commitment
ceremony has no way of knowing if such conduct is an expression of Elane Photography's approval
of such ceremonies.") (citing FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)).
307. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64.
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raphy from communicating its own views regarding whether same-sex
marriage should be permitted in New Mexico.308 Thus, Elane Photog-
raphy could post a note on its website that the contents of its photos
should not be construed as an endorsement of particular views,309 alt-
hough it seems doubtful that any views would be imputed to the photog-
raphers even absent such a disclaimer.
310
Willock had sought to have the commitment ceremony photo-
graphed when New Mexico did not recognize same-sex marriage or civil
unions.311 Thus, it was not as if the photograph would be of a wedding.
Rather, the difficulty was that the photograph might be thought to repre-
sent approval of a same-sex wedding. But if photographing a commit-
ment ceremony-something that was neither a marriage nor a civil un-
ion-nonetheless qualifies for an exemption because of what the profes-
sional thinks the photograph might symbolize, then any photograph that
the photographer believed would somehow communicate the wrong mes-
sage would justify the photographer's telling the customers to take their
business elsewhere.
Professor Wilson suggests that it should be permissible for a variety
of individuals-e.g., the baker, the photographer, or the reception hall
owner-to refuse to provide wedding services if those individuals have
moral qualms about such unions , as long as others are available to
provide the service.313 The same argument would presumably apply to
restaurants, hotels,314 movie theaters, and a whole host of public estab-
lishments, because providing service might be construed as symbolic
approval. Those who provide flowers or sell clothing might also be in-
308. Id. at 65. It is for these reasons that the Court would be unlikely to view this as compelled
speech. Some commentators do not appreciate some of the implications of FAIR. See, e.g., Nabet,
supra note 51, at 1542-43 ("In Elane Photography, however, application of the New Mexico statute
would directly impede Huguenin's ability to disseminate her preferred views; it would force the
photographer to affirm and possibly even endorse an ideology that she claims she sincerely believes
is wrong.").
309. Gottry, supra note 225, at 991 ("Elane Photography would find it even more difficult to
distance itself from the message, short of posting a disclaimer on its website, or printing a disclaimer
on the photos themselves.").
310. See supra notes 301, 306-07 and accompanying text.
311. Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions,
and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1201 (2012)
("New Mexico does not offer any relationship recognition to same-sex couples, let alone mar-
riage."); Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 12 ("New Mexico neither recognizes same-sex mar-
riage nor same-sex civil unions.").
312. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 318, 328 (2010) ("[A]ssisting
with marriage ceremonies has a religious significance that commercial services that are subject to
non-discrimination bans, like ordering burgers and hailing taxis, simply do not.").
313. See Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 13.
314. A separate issue involves those who rent out a few rooms in their own homes. For a
discussion of those exemptions, see generally David M. Forman, A Room for "Adam and Steve " at
Mrs. Murphy's Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommo-
dation, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326 (2012).
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cluded.315 Presumably, dry cleaning establishments, barbershops, and
hairdressers might also want not to participate. Grocery stores might
wish not to provide goods to those who wish to have in-home celebra-
tions. In short, most if not all businesses would seem permitted to refuse
to provide services so that they could avoid sending an undesired mes-
sage.
Professor Wilson notes that for "many people, marriage itself is a
religious sacrament and the assistance of it may well be a religious act in
their minds., 316 Yet, those with religious objections to same-sex marriage
might also have religious objections to same-sex couples raising children
or living together. Or, they might have religious objections to assisting
anyone who appears to be undermining traditional gender roles. Presum-
ably, the justification offered in the same-sex wedding context might be
used to refuse to provide any services at all to a vast array of individuals
for fear of promoting objectionable lifestyles or practices.317
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's analysis of the conditions under which the First
Amendment trumps equal protection values has been far from clear.
While the Court has been clear that states cannot force individuals to
affirm principles contrary to belief, the Court has also been clear that
symbolic conduct is not given as much protection as is speech, and that
not all conduct that the actor believes is expressive counts as expressive
conduct for constitutional purposes. Further, the Court has vacillated
with respect to the deference due to an organization's judgment that fol-
lowing the law would alter its message.
Variations in the jurisprudence notwithstanding, some constitutional
principles have been articulated consistently. Commercial entities do not
have the same constitutional rights as do noncommercial entities, and
conduct that does not communicate a message without further explana-
tion may well not even rise to the kind of activity afforded First Amend-
ment protection.
Businesses do not have the constitutional right to choose their cus-
tomers and should not be afforded that right as a matter of public policy.
If they could refuse to provide goods or services as a matter of con-
science whenever providing those goods or services were thought to in-
315. See Wilson & Singer, supra note 288, at 16. Professor Singer notes these implications of
Professor Wilson's position. Id.
316. Id. at 17.
317. Professor Wilson notes that some object to same-sex marriage but not to providing other
services. See Wilson, supra note 312, at 328 ("Many of these people have no objection generally to
providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to directly facilitating a same-sex
marriage."). But for those who object to providing any services to gays or lesbians for religious
reasons, one presumes that Professor Wilson would say that should be respected as long as others are
available to provide the needed services.
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accurately communicate a message of endorsement or, perhaps, toler-
ance, then such businesses would have been afforded a "carte blanche to
discriminate."
318
Certain kinds of organizations have associational rights that must be
respected. But those associational rights do not include the right to refuse
to provide commercial products or services to individuals about whom
one has religious reservations. Permitting businesses to engage in such
discrimination can only cause the country to become more balkanized
and individual groups more stigmatized-results that no one should
want.
318. Cf Renee M. Williams, Comment, The Ministerial Exception and Disability Discrimina-
tion Claims, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 423, 424 (2011) (discussing a case that she interprets to "pro-
vide[] religious organizations carte blanche to discriminate").
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